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THE VALUATION OF BIOTECH IPOS 
ABSTRACT 
 
The valuation of initial public offerings (IPOs) is of considerable interest, given the 
important role these enterprises play in economic growth and investors’ decisions.  IPO 
valuation is particularly challenging due to the meager information available about new 
enterprises at offering dates.  We extend the research on IPO valuation in various 
directions: First, we penetrate deep beyond the traditional proxies for value drivers, like 
R&D expenditures and cash flows, by defining and testing a host of specific product-
related and competitive environment value drivers; second, we examine IPO valuations at 
three distinct phases of the going-public process; third, we employ both the direct 
valuation and relative valuation approaches; and fourth, we round up the analysis by 
examining the long-term performance of IPOs.  Based on a sample of biotech IPOs that 
went public in the 1990s, we document the overwhelming importance of product-related 
and intellectual property fundamentals, as well as the irrelevance of several key signals, 
such as venture capital backing and the quality of underwriters, which played prominent  
roles in previous research. 
 
Keywords:  Valuation, Biotech IPOs, Non-Financial information 
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THE VALUATION OF BIOTECH IPOS 
 
1. Introduction 
 The valuation of initial public offerings (IPOs) is among the most intriguing 
finance and accounting phenomena, befuddling both investors and academics.  Despite 
considerable research efforts over the past quarter century, IPO valuations are still largely 
mysterious: What, for example, accounts for the persistent IPO underpricing—the 
positive difference of close to 20%, on average, between the price at the end of the first 
day of IPO and the beginning-of-day offer price (Ritter and Welch, 2002)? And what 
about the long-term underpricing of IPOs (the three-to-five-year inferior performance of 
IPOs relative to similar seasoned issues), which characterizes certain types of IPOs (in 
particular, small issues and those without backing of venture capitalists)?  Is such 
underperformance an indication of an overvaluation of IPOs at the end of the first day?  
While the extensive research on these and related issues provided useful insights, it is fair 
to say that several important questions remain unanswered.  Underlying most of the IPO 
pricing and performance questions is the valuation of IPOs by the various parties 
involved—venture capitalists, underwriters, and, most importantly, investors.  We 
address this matter of valuation in the current study. 
The unique challenge to the valuation of IPOs lies in the meager information 
about the firm and its prospects that is publicly available at the IPO date:  There are 
generally no established histories of sales, earnings, or cash flows for the firms going 
public; the issuers’ assets-in-place are in most cases negligible; and for high tech and 
biotech IPOs—the majority of offerings in the past 20 years—the primary assets are 
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intangibles (patents, trademarks, and alliances), which are notoriously difficult to value.  
Nevertheless, the valuation of IPOs is of considerable practical and theoretical 
importance, particularly in dynamic economies where IPOs flourish, and represent the 
main driver of economic growth.  It is important, therefore, to gain a thorough 
understanding of the valuation of enterprises that are newly introduced to capital 
markets.1 
 Prior IPO valuation studies examined three sets of potential value drivers: (a) 
financial fundamentals, such as sales, earnings, and research and development (R&D) 
expenditures, as well as market multiples like the book-to-market ratio or price-to-
EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) ratio (e.g., Kim 
and Ritter, 1999; Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004); (b) non-financial information 
on managerial actions taken by e-commerce Internet firms, such as acquisitions, new 
products, and alliances (e.g., Rajgopal, Venkatachalam, and Kotha, 2002; Bartov, 
Mohanram, and Seethamraju, 2002); and (c) various firm and issue attributes, such as the 
stake retained by pre-IPO owners, presumably signaling firm value to investors (e.g., 
Leland and Pyle, 1977).  However, the IPO valuation research is particularly thin 
regarding the second category of value drivers—non-financial fundamentals—with the 
exception of studies on the pre-bubble dotcom IPOs (see Bhagat and Rangan (2003) for a 
comparison of pre- and post-bubble valuation of IPOs). And yet, given the frequently 
negligible earnings, cash flows, and tangible assets of most IPOs, it is highly likely that 
the key to understanding the valuation of IPOs lies with the non-financial fundamentals. 
                                                 
1 Hand (2004) examines a related issue—the value relevance of financial and non-financial variables in the 
venture capital market and post-IPO public equity market, excluding the IPO stages which we analyze.   
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 Our study aims at filling the void in IPO valuation research.  To provide 
specificity and depth, we focus on an important segment of IPOs during the past two 
decades and likely in the foreseeable future—biotech companies.  For these firms, the 
non-financial fundamentals represent primarily the intangible assets of the enterprises 
(patents, development programs, alliances) and a priori are the primary value drivers.  
We reach far beyond previous valuation studies, which generally attempted to capture the 
value of intangibles by a single input measure—R&D expenditures—by focusing on the 
intermediate and final outputs of the development activities of the enterprise, such as 
patents, the stage of product development, and the diversity of the portfolio of products 
developed, as well as on other intangibles, such as alliances and joint ventures.  In the 
analysis, we of course include financial variables and IPO attributes (e.g., retained 
ownership) that were substantiated as value drivers by our predecessors.   
 There are two broad approaches in the valuation literature.  According to Bhojraj 
and Lee (2002), the first is a direct valuation approach, in which firm value is estimated 
directly from its fundamentals without considering the current price of other firms.  The 
second approach is relative valuation, in which firm value is estimated indirectly by 
reference to the prices of comparable firms.  While previous studies focus on either direct 
valuation or relative valuation, our study employs both valuation methods.  In our direct 
valuation analyses, similar to Bartov, Mohanram, and Seethamraju (2002), we focus on 
three IPO pricing stages—the initial (expected) offer price, the final offer price, and the 
aftermarket price (the price at end of first trading day).  This enables us to examine the 
pricing impact of information available at each pricing stage, as well as the effect of 
information revelation across stages.  We find that our product- level, non-financial 
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variables (number of total products, product development stage, patent and alliances) are 
consistent and important value drivers in all three pricing stages.  In our relative valuation 
analyses, we calculate an IPO firm’s relative valuation as the firm’s value-to-asset ratio 
over the corresponding ratio of a comparable publicly traded biotech firm, and find that 
product development stage and alliance are again significant factors in determining firm’s 
valuation across three different IPO stages.  We thus extend the current research in 
various directions by establishing the importance of non-financial fundamentals in 
valuing biotech IPOs under both the direct valuation and relative valuation approaches. 
 
 Our major findings are as follows: 
1. Direct Valuation 
a.  Of the various financial measures we examine, such as cash flows, 
sales, and assets, only R&D expenditures turns out to be a consistent value 
driver of IPOs. 
b. Our product- level non-financial variables are consistent and 
important value drivers in all three pricing stages. For biotech IPOs, major 
drivers are the stage of product development, the number of products 
under development along the path from research initiation to FDA 
approval, and the legal protection of intellectual property by patents. 
c.  Surprisingly, we find a negative association between IPO prices 
and the issuer’s number of alliances/joint ventures.  Alliances, 
representing the firm’s network of research and marketing, are prevalent 
in the examined sector and are often regarded as an important value driver 
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in the modern economy.  However, most biotech IPO alliances are made 
with large pharmaceutical companies. In the process, the IPO firm 
relinquishes equity in exchange for research and marketing support, and 
the estimated negative coefficient of alliances apparently reflects 
investors’ assessment that issuers transfer too much value to alliance 
partners. 
2. Relative Valuation 
We calculate the firm’s relative valuation as the IPO firm’s value-to-asset 
ratio over the corresponding ratio of a comparable publicly traded biotech 
firm.  Similar to the direct valuation results, we find that the stage of 
product development is a significantly positive factor and alliance is a 
significantly negative factor in determining firms’ relative valuation. 
3. Price Revisions 
We also perform cross-sectional regressions on initial price adjustment 
and underpricing in examining how the information of non-financial 
fundamentals is incorporated into valuation at different IPO stages.  We 
hypothesize that if these fundamentals are fully utilized by underwriter 
when setting the expected offer price, then these variables would not be 
predictive of subsequent price revisions.  The results are supportive of our 
hypothesis, since the non-financial variables are not significant in general.  
Instead, the initial price revision is significantly affected by ownership 
retention, offer range width, expected offer amount, venture capital 
backing and market condition, while the underpricing is significantly 
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affected by initial price adjustment, Nasdaq market return on IPO date, 
and the relative valuation measure.  This indicates that signaling and 
market condition variables are the main drivers for price revisions, as the 
fundamental variables are fully valued in the initial expected offer price.   
4. Long-Term Performance 
Finally, our long-term (three-year) examination of IPO performance 
reveals the reversal of several determinants of IPO values: Patent 
protection lead to excessive optimism of investors, indicated by negative 
long-term returns, whereas alliances, which are negatively perceived by 
investors at the IPO stage, in fact turn out to be value creators in the long-
term. 
 
Overall, our focus on the fundamental value drivers of biotech enterprises—the 
pace of product development, intellectual property protection, and collaborative 
activities—pays off by providing a consistent and rich set of determinants of IPO values. 
 The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the sample 
selection procedure, and Section 3 reports the summary statistics of both financial and 
non-financial information for our sample. Section 4 discusses the direct valuation 
findings, Section 5 studies relative valuation findings, Section 6 analyzes price revisions, 
and Section 7 presents results of the post-IPO analysis.  Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Sample Selection 
The data used in this study are derived from the following sources. First, we 
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obtained a list of IPOs underwritten by firm-commitment contracts from the Global New 
Issue database (available from Thomson Financial Data Corporation) for the period 
1991–2000, and we identified offerings by pharmaceutical and biotech companies (with 
the three-digit SIC code of 283, or the four-digit SIC code of 8731).  This yields an initial 
sample of 343 biotech IPOs from 1991 through 2000. We exclude from the sample 63 
unit offerings, American Deposit Receipts (ADRs), offerings of foreign corporations (F-1 
filings), and 37 firms for which we could not locate the prospectuses.  The sample is 
further restricted to development-stage companies for which the products under 
development can be classified by the various stages specified in the FDA approval 
process (e.g., pre-clinical tests, clinical tests, etc.).  Table 1 presents the sample selection 
stages, yielding a final sample of 122 IPOs, and Figure 1 presents the distribution of 
firms over the sample period. 
 
[Table 1 and Figure 1 about here] 
 
Financial information on the offerings (filing price ranges, offer prices, and shares 
filed and sold to the public), first-day returns, venture capital backing, as well as 
underwriters (number and identity of book managers/co-managers) is obtained from 
Thomson Financial’s Global New Issue database. The data are supplemented by the 
updated Carter and Manaster’s ranking of underwriters (Carter, Dark, and Singh, 1998).  
These rankings are frequently unavailable for small regional bankers with limited 
underwriting experience; we assign a rank of zero when no underwriting ranking is 
available. Financial statement information (assets, revenue, EBITDA, earnings, 
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shareholder’s equity, R&D expense, and cash flows from operation) is obtained from 
COMPUSTAT. 2  Finally, we rely on the IPO prospectus filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) for non-financial data on the number of employees, the 
number of PhDs or MDs, the number of patents owned, the number of products under 
development, the development stages of each product, and information on alliance 
agreements. 
 
3. Summary Statistics 
3.1 Share Price and Firm Value 
The pricing of IPOs is set in stages. First, underwriters establish an expected offer 
price range in the preliminary prospectus filed with the SEC, which we will identify as 
the initial price. Second, underwriters determine the actual offer price based on “book 
building” by soliciting feedback from investors during road shows (Benveniste and 
Spindt, 1989; Spatt and Srivastava, 1991).  This will be termed the offer price.  Finally, 
actual market prices are determined when IPOs start trading, culminating with the end-of-
first-day (aftermarket) price. 
 Our examination of IPO values, accordingly, consists of values of equities at three 
stages: the initial offer value, calculated as the product of the initial offer price (the 
midpoint of the preliminary offer price range) and the expected number of shares 
outstanding after the IPO; the final offer value, calculated as the product of the actual 
offer price and the expected number of shares outstanding at the end of the first day of 
trading; and the aftermarket value, calculated as the product of the closing price and 
                                                 
2 Missing financial information in COMPUSTAT is supplemented with data extracted directly from the 
prospectuses and 10K.   
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number of shares outstanding at the end of first day trading of the IPO.3   We also 
investigate the price adjustments across stages, namely the percentage change from the 
initial offer price to final offer price, as well as the percentage change from final offer 
price to the aftermarket price.  Our analysis thus focuses on the information available to 
the various parties involved in the IPO: initial owner and venture capitalists, underwriters, 
and investors. 
 As presented in Table 2 Panel A, the mean (median) prices per share of our 
sample firms were, respectively, $12.09 ($12.00) for initial offer price, $10.67 ($10.00) 
for the actual offer price, and $12.45 ($11.00) for the aftermarket price.  The 
corresponding firm values for each price stage exhibited wider variation, with a mean 
(median) firm value of $169 ($126) million for the initial market value, $155 ($101) 
million for the final offer market value, and $193 ($107) million for the aftermarket value, 
respectively. 
The share prices of biotech IPOs are, on average, adjusted downward by 
underwriters after the process of book building.  The mean (median) price adjustment is –
11% (–8%).  In the aftermarket, share prices of our sample firms increased by a mean 
value of 13% (with a median of 4%) in the first day of trading.  The first-day 
underpricing of our sample—mean value of 13%—is lower than that of all IPOs, which is 
close to 20% (Ritter and Welch, 2002).  This seems surprising, since underpricing is 
generally attributed to information asymmetry, and such asymmetry is believed to be 
high for biotech companies whose major assets are intangibles.  However, as is made 
                                                 
3 The number of shares outstanding at the end of the IPO day is obtained from Thomson Financial’s Global 
New Issue (GNI) database, and supplemented with information from CRSP when the entry in the GNI 
database is either missing or erroneous.  Note that Alexander Ljungqvist and Jay Ritter have reported that 
Thomson Financial Securities Data has a very high error rate on the post-issue shares outstanding (see 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~aljungqv/research.htm).   
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clear by our analysis, biotech companies disclose extensive product-related and 
intellectual property information in the IPO prospectus (and during road shows), and 
these data apparently substantially reduce information asymmetry, as evidenced by the 
below-average first day underpricing. 
 
3.2 Financial Information 
Our set of financial variables includes asset (COMPUSTAT item 6), revenues 
(item 12), EBITDA (item 13), earnings (item 18), shareholder’s equity (item 216), 
research and development expense (item 46), cash flows from operation (item 308), as 
well as sales change (calculated as the change in revenue from the prior year to the year 
of the IPO offering). Table 2 Panel B indicates that the mean (median) size of our sample 
firms is $15.55 ($11.21) million in assets, indicating the negligible physical assets of new 
biotech companies, and $3.33 ($1.19) million in revenues.  In our sample of 122 firms, 31 
firms (25%) did not record any revenue, and 26 firms (21%) reported revenue less than 
$1 million in the year prior to IPO.  The percentage of firms generating positive earnings 
is a meager 5% (6 out of 122 firms), with mean (median) earnings of –$7.34 (–$5.93) 
million.  Similarly, only 3% (4 out of 122 firms) of firms have positive EBITDA, with 
mean (median) EBITDA of –$6.82 (–$5.45) million.  In addition, 89% (108 out of 122 
firms) of our sample firms have negative cash flows, with a mean (median) of –$5.12 (–
$4.20) million. Research and development expense constitutes the major use of cash for 
our sample firms, as well as the major reason for the negative earnings, with a mean 
(median) annual R&D expenditure of $7.5 ($5.84) million.  The mean (median) equity 
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value, is $10.06 ($6.97) million, and the mean (median) sales change is $1.56 ($0.18) 
million. 
 As most biotech firms have no positive earnings and negligible revenues at the 
time of IPO, accounting data might not be particularly informative. This lack of 
information is exacerbated by the fact the current accounting reports are poorly equipped 
to recognize and measure intangible assets, except for the reporting of total R&D 
expenditures. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
3.3 Non-Financial Information 
 Previous studies have documented the utility of industry-specific non-financial 
measures in the valuation of emerging companies. Amir and Lev (1996) report that non-
financial indicators, such as population size and market penetration, are highly value 
relevant for cellular phone companies.  Similarly, Trueman, Wong, and Zhang (2000) and 
Demers and Lev (2001) report that Web traffic measures are value-relevant in 
determining the share prices of Internet companies. Bartov, Mohanram, and Seethamraju 
(2002) document that IPO valuations are significantly different between Internet and non-
Internet companies, as well as across the IPO stages. Rajgopal, Venkatachalam, and 
Kotha (2002) find that investors appear to supplement the relatively meager accounting 
information with data on post-IPO managerial actions in setting stock prices of business-
to-business (B2B) Internet firms.  While most recent valuation studies focus on internet 
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or software companies, we extend the analysis to the large and fast growing biotech 
sector. Our set of non-financial value drivers consists of the following: 
 
3.3.1 Pipeline of products under development:  We use the following variables 
to capture various dimensions of the all- important product pipeline of the firm (see Table 
2 Panel C): 
1. Number of products:  We identify all the products disclosed in the prospectus 
for each of our sample firms.  The sample firms have mean and median of 
eight products in various stage of developments.  Other things equal, the 
larger the number of products under development, the more diversified and 
less risky is the firm. 
2. Number of patents owned:  Patents provide the major protection for 
ownership of intellectual property. We identify all the patents owned by each 
sample firm from the prospectuses.  The sample firms were granted a mean 
(median) of 7.46 (5.0) patents prior to their IPO offerings. Relative to 
products, our firms have a mean of 4.48 patented products under development, 
amounting to 60% of total products under development. 
3. Product development stage: The development and approval process of a new 
pharmaceutical product can take more than a decade (Lerner, 2000).  Once a 
chemical compound is identified as a potential candidate for treating a certain 
medical condition, preclinical testing begins, comprising chemical and animal 
studies, to assess safety and possible biological effects.  Compounds with 
positive results from the preclinical trials that are accepted by the FDA are 
designated as “investigational new drugs” (INDs) for clinical testing in 
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humans.  There are three phases in the clinical testing process.  In Phase-I 
(safety) trials are primarily designed to determine the safety and 
pharmacological properties of the compound.  Phase-II (efficacy) trials are 
designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug and to identify side effects.  
Phase-III trials are conducted on a large number of patients (sometimes in 
thousands) over several years in order to assess the long-term side effects of 
the drug and provide additional information on the effectiveness of the 
treatment.  Upon the completion of Phase-III trials, firms are required to file a 
“new drug application” (NDA) for final review by the FDA.  For each NDA, a 
special advisory committee is created that makes the final recommendation on 
whether the drug should be released for commercial sale or rejected. 
We construct our development-stage indicator by adopting a procedure 
used in Guo, Lev, and Zhou (2004). The stage score for a given product is set 
equal to the total (expected) number of years spent, on average, to reach each 
development stage. Accordingly, a numerical variable with a value of 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 7, 10, and 12 is assigned for products in the stage of screening, 
development, preclinical testing, IND application, Phase-I clinical trials, 
Phase-II clinical trials, Phase-III clinical trials, and NDA application, 
respectively. When a product has received FDA approval, it is also given a 
score of 12. For each firm with multiple products, we compute the “average 
development stage” as the mean development stage of all of its products 
(pipeline). As seen in Table 2 Panel C, the mean development stage of the 
sample firms’ product is 3.87 years (median 3.58), which is close to Phase-I 
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clinical trials.  Thus, most of the products under development of the sample 
firms are in a relatively early stage of development. 
4. Number of alliance agreements:  We record the number of alliance 
agreements, including strategic alliances, joint ventures, licensing agreements, 
R&D collaborations, as well as marketing/distribution, manufacturing, and 
supply alliance agreements.  Alliance agreements might be value-relevant 
because they generally contribute research capabilities or capital from partners; 
furthermore, they often carry a positive signal about the future market 
potential of the product under development. In our sample, firms report a 
mean value of 2.22 alliance agreements. However, substantial equity is often 
relinquished to partners when biotech alliances are made with big 
pharmaceutical companies.  This might have a negative effect on IPO 
valuation.  In our sample, a mean of 2.77 products per firm are covered by the 
alliance agreements, and 1.84 products per firm are reported with commercial 
rights assigned to alliance partners, amounting to 22% of total products under 
development. 
 
3.3.2 Financial Intermediaries: Previous research documents that participation 
by venture capitalists (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens, 1990; Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991), as well as offerings underwritten by a highly ranked bankers (Beatty and 
Ritter, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Carter, Dark, and Singh, 1998), signal issue 
quality and therefore lead to favorable valuation by the capital market (reducing the 
perceived uncertainty about firm value). Our variable Venture Capital Backing is an 
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indicator with the value of 1 for an issue backed by venture capitalists, and 0 otherwise. 
Underwriter ranking is a discrete reputation measure ranging from 0 to 9, which was 
proposed by Carter and Manaster (1990), where a 9 (0) represents the most (least) 
prestigious underwriter.  On average, 91% of the sample firms are backed by venture 
capitalists and the mean underwriter ranking is 8.75. 
 
3.3.3 Ownership Retention: Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) report that high-quality 
IPOs differentiate themselves from those with low quality by retaining a higher portion of 
the firms’ shares after IPO.  The percentage of shares retained by firm insiders can serve 
as a signal for firm quality and thereby affect firm value.  The variable Ownership 
Retention is the percentage of ownership retained by the pre-IPO shareholders after 
offerings. On average, pre-IPO owners retain 74% of ownership. 
 
3.3.4 Market Condition:  Kim and Ritter (1999) report that comparable firm 
multiples (e.g., book-to-market) are related to IPO valuation.  Thus, valuation of IPOs 
could be more favorable when firms within the same industry are traded at high price 
levels.  To capture market conditions, we construct the variable Market Condition by 
calculating the cumulative return of the value-weighted index of seasoned firms in the 
pharmaceutical and biotech industry in the six-month period prior to the IPO.4  The mean 
six-month cumulative return is 15% (Table 2 Panel C), indicating that the sample IPOs 
chose to go public when market conditions were favorable.  This is consistent with 
                                                 
4 This value-weighted index includes firms in the three-digit SIC code 283, and the four-digit SIC code 
8731, calculated using CRSP monthly returns.  Results remain unchanged when Market Condition is 
measured over a 3- or 12-month period prior to the IPO. 
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Lerner (1994), who finds that the market condition is the primary factor in firms’ 
decision to go public. 
 
4. Direct Valuation of IPOs 
4.1. Main Analyses 
Considering that the variables for biotech IPO firms are highly skewed, we scale 
our variables by total assets when feasible and use the deflated data in our OLS 
regressions so as to control for heteroscedasticity. 5  We use total assets as the deflator 
because 25 percent (31 out of 122) of our sample firms have zero sales, 16 percent (19 
out of 122) have negative book value of equity, and 95 percent (116 out of 122) have 
negative earnings.  Table 3 presents the correlations among the variables (scaled by total 
assets) used in the study.  Of the financial variables examined, cash flows, R&D 
expenditures and sales change are correlated with the IPO prices in each of the three 
stages (cash flow is negatively correlated, though).  The product- level fundamentals—
total number of products, stage of development, and patent protection—are all correlated 
with IPO prices.  The number of products with assigned commercial rights is negatively 
correlated with prices, providing an initial indication that excessive rights are 
relinquished to alliance partners.  Venture capital backing and underwriter quality are 
negatively related to prices, which runs counter to established results in the finance 
literature.  These correlations, however, vanish in the regression analysis. 
 
                                                 
5 We test heteroscedasticity for all models in Tables 4 through 9.  Out of 19 models from these 6 tables, 
only two models have significant Chi-square statistics, one at the five-percent level and the other at the ten-
percent level.  We then calculate White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics for these two 
models, and find that the results remain unchanged.  
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
Our main regressions results are presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6.  To present our 
results in a clear manner, we classify our regression variables into the following three 
groups. 
 
Group 1 – Financial variables: cash flow from operations, R&D expenses, sales 
change. 
Group 2 – Signaling and market condition variables: ownership retention, venture 
capital backing, underwriter ranking, and market condition. 
Group 3 – Fundamental non-financial variables: number of products, average 
development stage of pipeline, patent, and alliance. 
 
 Our valuation analyses are now conducted uniformly with the following three 
specifications:  In Tables 4, 5 and 6, Model 1 reports results using Group 1 variables, 
Model 2 reports results using Groups 1 and 2 variables, and Model 3 reports results using 
Groups 1, 2 and 3 variables.   
Table 4 presents various regression estimates of the first IPO price stage—the 
initial offer market value—regressed on combinations of financial and non-financial 
variables.  Model 1 includes the main financial variables that were found significant in 
previous valuation studies. R&D expenditures—a major value driver of intangible 
assets—is highly significant.  Cash flows is significant as well, but with a negative 
coefficient, reflecting the heavy investment in intangibles (R&D, customer relations) 
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made by biotech IPOs (note the negative correlation coefficient (–0.90) between R&D 
and cash flows in Table 3).  Sales change is marginally positive.6  Model 2 adds the 
variables of ownership retention ratio, venture capital backing, underwriter ranking, and 
market conditions to the regression.  There is a slight decrease in adjusted R2 which is 
negligible, seeming to suggest that ownership retention and market conditions are not 
significant value drives in the initial pricing stage.  However, when the fundamentals are 
added to these variables in Model 3, ownership retention and market condition become 
significant.  The added product-related fundamental variables—number of  products, 
development stage, patents, and alliances—are highly statistically significant (at £5%), 
adding 16% to the R2 value and yielding an adjusted-R2 for Model 3 of 82.7%.  This 
indicates the importance of non-financial variables in the valuation of IPOs at the initial 
offer stage.  Notably, previous valuation studies using seasoned biotech firms (e.g., Hand, 
2003) proxied for the intangible fundamentals by R&D expenditures.  Our results 
indicate that R&D—an input measure—is only a partial indicator of value.  An improved 
characterization of valuation can be achieved by measures that indicate the output of the 
R&D process: number of products under development, stage of product development, 
and patent protection (intellectual property). 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
                                                 
6 Out of 122 sample firms, the growth rate in sales is undefined for nine firms, which have positive sales in 
the IPO year, but zero sales in the year prior to the IPO.  Because of this sample attrition issue, we use sales 
change deflated by total assets instead.  Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper for 
regression analysis based on growth rate in sales on a subsample of 113 firms.  
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Interestingly, ownership retention and market conditions at the time of IPO 
become significantly positive when combined with the non-financial variables, 
suggesting that IPO value increases when a firm retains more shares (as suggested by 
signaling theory), and when the IPO is conducted in a favorable market environment.  
Note that the cash flow variable becomes insignificant in the full models (Model 3).  
Thus, when both R&D and its consequences (products and patents) are fully accounted 
for, the counterintuitive negative coefficient of cash flows vanishes. 
The variables representing venture capital backing and the Carter–Manaster 
underwriter ranking are both found to be insignificant.  Other researches have previously 
found these variables to be positively and significantly associated with the quality of 
corporate governance, innovation activities, and operating efficiency of IPOs.  Our 
findings indicate that at the initial stage of IPO pricing—where the value is set by owners 
and venture capitalists—the existence of venture capitalists, and the quality underwriters 
contribute little to valuation.  Summarizing, estimates in Table 4 indicate that the initial 
pricing of biotech IPOs is almost fully determined (R2 of 83%) by intangible assets: R&D 
expenditures and output indicators, which comprise the number of products under 
development, the stage of product development, and  the legal protection (patents) of the 
products. 
Tables 5 and 6 report the regressions of the market values at the final offer stage 
and the end-of-first-day IPO stage on financial and non-financial variables.7  These prices 
reflect an increasing role of investors in setting prices: the reaction of prospective 
investors during road-shows affecting the final offer price, and the actual first day trading 
                                                 
7 We remove one outlier for regressions in Tables 4 and 5, and two outliers for regressions in Table 6 based 
on standard SAS procedure. 
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affecting the aftermarket price.  Note the decrease in adjusted R2 as we move from 
explaining the initial price (Model 3, R2 = 82.7%, Table 4), through the actual offer price 
(R2 = 74.1%, Table 5), to the aftermarket price (R2 = 59.7%, Table 6).  Thus, the initial 
price for owners and VCs is primarily based on product development fundamentals, 
whereas subsequent prices, affected by investors, reflect various other factors and noise, 
which are unrelated to fundamentals.  Nevertheless, in both Tables 5 and 6, the 
intangibles input (R&D) and output indicators are all highly significant and jointly 
explain more than half of the cross-sectional variability of IPO prices.   
Investors appear to value patent protection more highly than do 
entrepreneurs/venture capitalists.  The coefficient of this variable in Tables 5 and 6 is 
larger than that in Table 4.  In the long-term analysis, (Section 7) we will see that those 
high valuations are excessive. 
The consistent negative coefficients of alliances—both the percentage of products 
with alliances and the percentage of products with rights assigned to others—seem 
puzzling.  The networking activities of firms, and in particular the development and 
marketing of products in alliance with other entities, were hailed in recent years as among 
the most important strategic developments of modern business.  Our estimates, however, 
consistently indicate that alliances are considered by investors as value-reducing, other 
things being equal.  A possible explanation is that investors perceive the ownership rights 
relinquished to alliance partners, mostly large pharmaceutical firms, as excessive relative 
to the benefits gained.  Start-ups often negotiate alliance/joint venture terms with 
established companies from a position of weakness, and investors apparently assess that 
undue value and rights are given away.  Since the coefficient on alliances are negative, 
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we believe that this suggest that the market views alliances as selling valuable equity in 
potential products, and thus reacts negatively. 8  To verify our explanation, we look into 
the contractual details of those alliance agreements, and find that there are a substantial 
number of firms who assign the commercial rights to their alliance partners.  Thus, we 
create a new variable called Percentage of Products with Commercial Rights Assigned to 
Alliance Partners, and replace in the alliance variable in our regressions.  As we predict, 
the coefficients on this variable are significantly negative (t = –2.30 for the initial offer 
stage; t = –2.01 for the final offer stage, t = –2.25 for the aftermarket stage), indicating 
that the market indeed reacts negatively to the selling alliance agreements.  In addition, 
we find that some firms reacquire the commercial rights of their products from their 
alliance partners several years after the IPO, further supporting our hypothesis.  For 
example, AtheroGenics, which went public on August 9, 2000, disclosed the following in 
its 10K filing dated December 31, 2003.  
In October 1999, we entered into a worldwide exclusive license agreement with 
Schering-Plough. Under the agreement we granted to Schering-Plough an 
exclusive license under our patents and know-how to make, use and sell AGI-
1067 and other specified compounds for the treatment of restenosis, coronary 
artery disease and artherosclerosis. Schering-Plough paid us an initial 
nonrefundable licensing fee of $5,000,000 upon signing the agreement and, 
pursuant to the terms of the agreement, had assumed responsibility for all costs 
going forward associated with the development, manufacturing and 
commercialization of products containing AGI-1067 and any other licensed 
compound.  
In October 2001, we reacquired the rights to AGI-1067 and related technology 
and terminated the exclusive license agreement between us and Schering-Plough 
to permit us to expedite the development of the compound. With the termination of 
this license agreement, Schering-Plough has no further rights to the technology or 
financial obligations to us.  
                                                 
8 In the long-term analysis presented in Section 7, we will return to this issue with surprising results. 
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Finally, coefficients of venture capital backing and underwriters’ quality remain 
insignificant in Tables 5 and 6. 9   It appears that in our sample where considerable 
information about the firms’ intangible assets—and, most importantly, where their 
product development process is imparted to capital markets—noisy value proxies such as 
venture capital backing and underwriter quality become redundant.  This is yet another 
indication of the importance to investors of information disclosure about the strategic 
fundamentals of the firm. 
 
[Table 5 and Table 6 about here] 
 
4.2 Additional Tests 
4.2.1 Value-to-Sales Ratio 
 While value-to-sales, value-to-EBIDTA or value-to-earnings ratios are popular 
metrics in valuation studies (e.g. Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004), we use value-
to-asset ratio as our main dependent variable because other metrics would cause severe 
attrition for our sample of biotech IPOs.  Out of 122 firms in our sample, we find that 31 
firms have zero sales, with another 26 firms have sales less than $1 million.  In addition, 
118 firms (97%) have negative EBITDA, and 116 firms (95%) have negative earnings.   
 The lack of direct application of conventional valuation metrics to our sample 
speaks to the challenge of valuing biotech/biotech IPOs.  As the majority of our sample 
firms have no (positive) earnings and their business generates meager revenue at the time 
of the offering, most of our sample firms are therefore not included in previous valuation 
                                                 
9 We scale the underwriter ranking variable by nine, the maximum underwriting ranking score.  We also 
scale Underwriter Ranking by total assets, and find similar results to those reported in Tables 4, 5 and 6.   
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research on IPOs (Kim and Ritter, 1999; Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004). The 
results of our study present an alternative valuation approach to these IPOs. 
For a subsample of 65 firms with at least $1 million in sales, we ran regressions 
using the value-to-sales ratio as the dependent variable, and scaled Cash Flow from 
Operations, R&D Expense, Sales Change, Number of Total Products, and the Average 
Development Stage of Pipeline by sales.  Our results are similar to those reported in 
Tables 4, 5, and 6.  The Average Development Stage of Pipeline is significantly positive 
(£ 5% or better) at all three stages, and Percentage of Products with Alliances is 
significantly negative (t = - 1.79) at the final offer stage.  However, due to severe attrition 
of sample size after excluding firms with zero/minimal sales, Number of Total Products 
and Percentage of Products with Patents are no longer significant.   
 
4.2.2 Insider Presence 
 We also consider the insider presence at the time of IPO as an alternative to the 
signaling variable ownership retention ratio.  We hand-collect this information on insider 
ownership (shares beneficially owned by all directors and executive officer as a group 
before the IPO and expected to be owned by these people after the IPO) from the 
prospectuses for all our sample firms.  The mean (median) insider ownership is 50.5% 
(51.3%) before the IPO, and 37.6% (38.4%) after the IPO.  We replace ownership 
retention with the insider ownership after the IPO in Model 3 of Tables 4, 5, and 6 and 
find our results are similar to those use ownership retention with one exception.  The sign 
on the insider variable are now negative, insignificant for the initial offer stage (t = -1.05) 
and final offer stage (t = -0.71), and significant for the 1st day aftermarket stage (t = -
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1.94).  Findings are similar when we replace the ownership retention with the insider 
ownership prior to the IPO.  The correlation between the insider presence prior to IPO 
and the ownership retention is significantly negative (p = -0.25, significant at the 1% 
level).  This indicates that firms with a stronger insider presence are more likely to retain 
fewer shares.  Our results suggest that the market considers a strong insider presence as 
being detrimental to shareholders’ wealth. 10   When we run regressions with both 
ownership retention and insider ownership after the IPO (or prior to the IPO), our results 
are very similar to those reported in the tables.  While the ownership retention variable is 
significantly positive at all three stages, the insider variable is negative but insignificant 
in all three stages.   
 
5. Relative Valuation of IPOs 
 Since the IPO dates of our sample firms are spread from 1991 to 2000, the 
industry multiples may change considerably during this ten-year period.  To remove this 
time effect, we choose a comparable biotech firm at the time of an IPO as a reference.  
We now use the ratio between the IPO firm’s multiple and the comparable firm’s 
multiple as a dependent variable to test the effect of non-financial fundamentals on this 
relative valuation measure.   
Kim and Ritter (1999) and Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) report results 
on valuation of IPO firms using comparable firm multiples. 11   These two studies, 
however, differ slightly on the procedure of selecting a comparable firm.  While Kim and 
                                                 
10 Darrough and Rangan (2005) find when the insiders plan to sell their pre-offering shareholdings in an 
IPO, the firm tends to spend less in R&D to increase current earnings at the expense of future earnings.   
11 Liu, Nissim, and Thomas (2002) and Bhojraj and Lee (2002) study the relative valuations of mature 
firms. 
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Ritter use recent IPOs (those went public no more than 12 months prior to the offer date 
of the candidate IPO) in the same industry as comparable firms, Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan use selected publicly traded firms in the same industry as comparable firms.  
Procedure used by Kim and Ritter is not applicable in our study (we will be redrawing 
many of our sample IPOs as comparable firms).  Therefore, we use a procedure similar to 
that used in Purnanandam and Swaminathan, as described in the following: 
 
(1) For a given IPO year, we consider biotech firms (with SIC codes of 283x and 
8731) which are covered in Compustat in the prior fiscal year.  We exclude firms 
that went public during the past three years, and non-ordinary common shares, 
close-end funds, and ADRs.   
(2) Remaining firms are sorted into three portfolios by total assets, and then each 
asset portfolio is sorted into three portfolios by EBITDA.  As a result, we have 9 
(3x3) portfolios of comparable firms in each year. 
(3) Each sample IPO firm is matched with a portfolio of comparable firms based 
on total assets and EBITDA.  In that portfolio, one firm with the closest total 
assets and the same (positive/negative) sign of EBITA is selected as the 
“comparable firm”.  In some cases, the matching firms are repeated as there are 
only a few firms that meet the criteria. 
 
Table 2 Panel B provides summary statistics for our sample firms and matching 
firms.  While the mean (median) total assets for sample firms is $15.55 million ($11.21 
million), the mean (median) total assets for matching firms is $18.71 million ($10.98 
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million).  While the mean (median) EBITDA for sample firms is $-6.82 million ($-5.45 
million), the mean (median) EBITDA for matching firms is $-6.37 million ($-5.60 
million).  The sample firms and matching firms obviously share similar characteristics in 
term of total assets and EBITDA because our selecting procedure for matching firms is 
based on these two variables.   
The relative valuation measure, P/V ratio, is calculated as the ratio between the 
IPO firm’s value-to-asset ratio (P or price) and the corresponding value-to-asset ratio of 
the comparable firm (V or intrinsic value).  Specifically, the Initial Offer P/V, Final Offer 
P/V, and Aftermarket P/V ratio are the firm’s value-to-assets ratios at the initial offer, 
final offer and aftermarket stages divided by the corresponding value-to-asset ratio of the 
matching biotech firm.  Table 2 Panel A presents summary statistics on P/V ratios at 
different stages.  The median P/V ratios are 1.87, 1.59, and 1.92 at the initial offer, final 
offer and aftermarket stages.  They are significantly different from 1 at the one-percent 
level, suggesting that bio tech IPOs are consistently overvalued. 
We use the P/V ratios at three different stages as dependent variables in Table 7 to 
examine their correlation with the non-financial variables.  As our results in Table 7 
indicate, our findings on relative valuation analyses are consistent with those on direct 
valuation analyses reported in Tables 4, 5 and 6.12  Sales change, ownership retention, 
stage of product development and alliance are significant at all three stages, and market 
condition is significant at the final offer stage and aftermarket stage but marginal at the 
initial offer stage.  Comparing with the direct valuation analyses in Tables 4, 5 and 6, we 
                                                 
12 We exclude two outliers based on standard SAS procedure when run regressions for Table 7. 
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find that ownership retention, stage of product development, and alliance are important 
value drivers in determining the firm’s absolute value and relative value.   
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
6. Price Revisions  
 We now conduct the analysis on price revisions across three IPO stages (initial 
price adjustment and underpricing) to gauge whether there is any differential effect of 
non-financial variables on IPO valuation at the pre-offer, final offer, and aftermarket 
stages.  If the results on price revisions indicate that non-financial variables are not 
significant in explaining the change in valuation, then it suggests that the underwriters 
and investors have fully priced these non-financial fundamentals in the pre-offer, final 
offer and aftermarket stages.   
 We first investigate the initial price adjustment, namely the difference between 
the final offer price and the initial price, divided by the initial offer price.  From Table 2 
Panel A, we learn that the mean (median) initial adjustment is –11% (–8%).  Benveniste 
and Spindt (1989) argue that firms that have greater uncertainty surrounding the true 
value of the shares are more likely to revise their offer price.  Consistent with Hanley 
(1993), we include the percentage width of offer range and the expected initial offer size 
as measures of ex ante risk in our initial price adjustment regressions.  Following 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), we also control for size, and book-to-market 
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ratio.  Size is measured as the log of total assets,13 and book-to-market ratio is calculated 
as the book value of equity (data60) for the fiscal year after the IPO date over the market 
value of equity at the close of the first trading day.   
 Table 8 reports the regression estimates of the initial price adjustment on financial 
and non-financial variables, indicating that book-to-market, ownership retention, venture 
capital backing, offer range width, initial offer size, and market condition are significant.  
Book-to-market ratio is negatively significant because the first-day closing market 
capitalization will introduce a negative correlation between initial price revision and 
book-to-market ratio.14  The significant negative coefficients on ownership retention and 
venture capital backing indicate that the firms tend to experience a small revision in offer 
prices between the initial offer and final offer stages when the firms’ pre-IPO owners 
retain more shares or the firms have the guidance from the venture capitalists.  The 
coefficients on offer range width and initial offer size are significantly positive.  This is 
similar to Hanley (1993), who finds the coefficient on offer range width to be 
significantly positive and the coefficient on initial offer size to be marginally positive (t = 
1.50).  Underwriters are likely to set a wider offer range at the initial offer stage so as to 
provide flexibility in determining final offer price when they are not very certain of the 
true issue price.  Thus, wider offer range width tends to lead to larger initial price 
revision.  Since large initial offers are more likely to attract investors’ attention, those 
firms with large initial offer sizes are also more likely to experience favorable initial price 
                                                 
13 We also conduct analysis using log(1+Sales) as the size variable and find similar results.  Note that 
log(1+Sales) is used because 31 firms have zero sales.   
14 Initial price revision and book-to-market ratio are indeed negatively correlated (p = - 0.18, significant at 
the 10% level).  Purnanandam and Swa minathan (2004) argue that first-day return and book-to-market ratio 
are negatively correlated because closing price is used in calculating both variables.  While closing price is 
not used in calculating initial price revision, initial price revision and book-to-market ratio are negatively 
correlated because initial price revision and first-day return are positively correlated (p = 0.40, significant at 
the 1% level). 
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revisions.  Finally, our results suggest that underwriters often adjust the price between the 
initial and final offer primarily based on the prevailing market conditions. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
The second price adjustment—from the final offer to the end-of- first-day price—
which in fact is the widely studied IPO underpricing phenomenon, is examined in Table 
9.15  Table 2 Panel A indicates that the mean (median) underpricing is 13% (4%).  To 
account for the “partial adjustment” phenomenon, 16  namely that underpricing is 
positively associated with prior revision in offer prices, (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter, 
1988; Hanley, 1993) we include the initial price adjustment as an independent variable to 
our underpric ing regressions.  Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) document that 
“overvalued” (high P/V ratio) IPOs provide high first-day returns, and thus we add the 
final offer P/V ratio to our regression in Model 4.  Because underpricing is the price 
revision on the  IPO day, we use the Nasdaq market return on the IPO day to measure the 
market condition.  We again control for offer size, size and book-to-market.   
 Table 9 estimates indicate that the book-to-market ratio, initial price adjustment, 
the Nasdaq market return on the IPO day, and the final offer P/V ratio are highly 
significant.  Again, book-to-market ratio is negatively significant because underpricing 
and book-to-market ratio are negatively correlated as closing price is used to calculate 
                                                 
15 We remove one outlier based on standard SAS procedure when running regressions for Table 9. 
16 Benveniste and Spindt (1989) provide a theoretical explanation for the “partial adjustment” phenomenon.  
They argue that strong demand for share (revealing good information) will lead to share rationing, and thus 
underwriters may not be able to fully reward investors for their truthful revelations.  With shares rationing, 
the offer price will only partially adjust to good information, and underwriter will use underpricing, along 
with increased share allocation to compensate investors for revealing their information.  Therefore, 
underpricing is positively related to prior revision in offer prices. 
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underpricing and book-to-market ratio.17  Our sample of biotech IPOs also experience the 
“partial adjustment” phenomenon, as the underpricing is larger when the firm experiences 
a larger initial price adjustment.  Not unexpectedly, the underpricing is positively related 
to the Nasdaq return during the IPO day.  Since all our sample firms are traded on 
Nasdaq, the momentum on that market will cause the share prices of the IPO firm to rise 
as well, and thus lead to a larger underpricing.  Consistent with Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2004), we also find that “overvalued” (high P/V ratio) IPOs tend to have 
high first-day returns.  In addition, the underpricing is somewhat larger when pre-IPO 
owners retain a larger percentage of shares, probably because ownership retention signals 
the positive quality of the IPO, thereby creating a strong first-day demand by investors 
and in turn causing the share prices to rise.  Finally, estimates in Table 9 imply that firms 
with venture capital backing and/or firms with more prestigious underwriters experience 
diminished underpricing.  Since underpricing generally reflects the information 
asymmetry surrounding the IPO, these estimates suggest that venture capital and 
underwriters’ quality reduce information asymmetry during the first trading day 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990).   
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
 The results in Tables 4, 5 and 6 indicate that the non-financial fundamentals are 
important drivers in valuing biotech firms at various IPO stages, and now the results in 
Tables 8 and 9 further suggest these fundamentals are fully incorporated in the expected 
                                                 
17 Underpricing and book-to-market ratio are negatively correlated (p = - 0.31, significant at the 1% level). 
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offer prices, since the non-financial variables, other than Alliance in Model 3 of Table 8 
(t=1.67), are not significant in Tables 8 and 9 regressions.  Instead, the initial price 
revision is significantly affected by ownership retention, offer range width, expected 
initial offer size, venture capital backing and market condition, and the underpricing is 
significantly affected by initial price adjustment, Nasdaq market return on IPO date, and 
the relative valuation measure final offer P/V ratio.  This indicates that signaling and 
market condition variables are the main drivers for price revisions, as the fundamental 
variables are fully priced at various IPO pricing stages.  Our results on these signaling 
and market condition variables are consistent with Hanley (1993), and that on the relative 
valuation measure is consistent Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004).  We believe that 
this strengthens our analyses, and provides extra support to our hypothesis that 
fundamentals are efficiently priced at the initial offer, final offer and 1st day aftermarket 
stages as shown in Tables 4, 5 and 6. 
 Loughran and Ritter (2004) find that the levels of underpricing are extremely 
different between the pre-internet bubble period (before 1998) and the internet bubble 
period (1999-2000).  Following their paper, we divide our sample into two subsamples: 
the pre-bubble period (1991-1998) subsample with 96 firms, and the bubble period 
(1999-2000) subsample with 26 firms.  We perform underpricing regressions for the pre-
bubble period (1991-1998) sub-sample.  The regression results are qualitatively similar to 
those for the full sample.  Book-to-market ratio (t= -1.89), Nasdaq market return on IPO 
date (t = 2.39) and final offer P/V ratio (t = 1.82) are still significant, and the initial price 
adjustment is marginal (t = 1.53).  Again, none of the non-financial variables is 
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significant.  We are unable to perform similar analyses for the bubble period (1999-2000) 
subsample, as there are only 26 firms.   
 
7. Post-Issuance IPO Performance 
We have identified above the major determinants of IPO values.  This leaves open 
the question whether the aftermarket prices are efficient, fully reflecting the information 
about the subsequent performance of IPOs available at the IPO date.  This is an important 
question for resource allocation in capital markets, particularly given mixed evidence 
about the long-term performance of IPOs (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Brav and 
Gompers, 1997; Brav, Geczy, and Gompers, 2000).  Accordingly, we now examine the 
three-year performance of our sample IPOs. 
 Specifically, using the monthly data from CRSP, Nasdaq, and the Amex-NYSE, 
we record the returns of the sample IPO firms from the beginning of the second month 
dated from the month of the IPO until the earliest of its month of delisting, the 37th 
month after offering, or December 2002 (the end of our return data). A 36-month buy-
and-hold abnormal return measure (BHAR) is calculated by compounding the monthly 
returns in excess of a matched portfolio returns: 
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where the index t takes on the value 1 at the month of IPO offering, and min[37,delist] is 
the earliest of  the 37th month, the month of delisting, or December 2003.  The variable 
rit is the return for sample firm i in month t, and mrit is the contemporaneous return 
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generated by the matched portfolio.  We construct the matched size and book-to-market 
portfolio using the following procedure: Starting in January 1990, we form size quintile 
breakpoints using NYSE firms (Fama and French, 1992).  Market value is obtained from 
CRSP as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the end of 
December of the preceding year, while book value is obtained from the annual 
COMPUSTAT file (data item 60).  We create book-to-market quintiles using NYSE 
firms, and then form 25 size and book-to-market portfolios by intersecting the portfolios 
and allocating all NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq firms (excluding our IPO firms) to be 
included in these portfolios. Such benchmark portfolios are reformed for each year.  An 
equally weighted return of all firms in a given portfolio is calculated and used as the 
benchmark return. For the IPO firms, we calculate the market value of equity on the date 
of issuance.  The book-to-market ratio of the IPO year is the value obtained by dividing 
per share book value of equity after the offering  (available from the Global New Issue 
database) by the aftermarket closing price.   
 In Table 10 we present sample mean values of BHAR on our full sample of 
biotech IPOs,  as well as subsamples of IPO firms with above- (high) and below- (low) 
median value in variables of market condition, development stage (scaled by total asset 
value), number of products (scaled by total asset value), percentage of products with 
patents, percentage of products with alliances, and underwriter ranking. Based on the 
buy-and-hold measure, the IPO sample underperformed the matched portfo lio by 
14.32%, but this excess return is not statistically different from zero.  These results are 
consistent with Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000), who report that the documented IPO 
underperformance in the long-run vanishes when the returns are adjusted by size and 
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book-to-market ratio. 
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
On a univariate basis, we next examine the differential performance of the sample 
IPOs grouped by the various value drivers established above:  market conditions, 
development stage, number of products, percentage of products with patents, percentage 
of products with alliances, and VC backing.  Sample IPOs with above- and below-median 
values of the variables examined are classified into corresponding high and low 
subsamples. Results presented in Table 10 indicate that IPOs issued when the market 
conditions were favorable perform poorly in the subsequent 36 months of trading 
according (with marginal significance). This implies a certain excessive optimism by 
investors.  The results also show that IPOs rich in patents underperform in the long run 
(BHAR measure), as do IPOs with a below-median number of alliances.  The latter two 
findings jointly suggest that investors’ negative reaction to alliances during the IPO, 
apparently reflecting concerns with excessive rights relinquished to alliance partners, 
might have been exaggerated.  As the benefits of alliances (higher revenues and earnings) 
become clear over time, investors revise the early valuations to reflect the contribution of 
alliances. 
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
We examine the association between the long-term abnormal returns of IPOs in a 
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multivariate cross-sectional regression.  First, we examine the distribution of the buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR). We exclude one extreme outlier of the BHAR 
observation from our return analysis.  Second, we perform the log BHAR regression 
(with detailed formulation as specified in Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004)). The 
results are very similar to the BHAR regressions, as tabulated in Table 11. As the 
estimates of Table 11 indicate, the results suggest overreaction at IPO to patent 
information, a factor with positive coefficients in the models of Tables 4–6, but a 
negative coefficient in Table 11.  Finally, note the positive and significant coefficient in 
Table 11 of “percentage of products with alliances.” Recall the consistent negative 
coefficients of alliances in the pricing regressions (Tables 4–6).  The positive alliances 
coefficients in Table 11 suggest that investors’ concerns about relinquishing too much 
equity to alliance partners might be excessive.  Developing products with alliance or joint 
venture partners appears to pay in the long-run after all. 
 
[Table 12 about here] 
  
In Table 12, we calculate the risk-adjusted returns --- these adjusted returns are the 
intercept terms by regressing each sample firm’s monthly return in excess of one month 
T-bill rate on the Fama and French factors in the period of the 2nd to 37th months (or to 
the month of delisting) subsequent to the month of IPO issuance. We then perform the 
regression analysis with those risk-adjusted returns on our non-financial variables. As 
indicated in Table 12, the results are very similar to those with the BHAR analysis.  The 
variable of Percentage of Products with  Patents continues to be negatively correlated 
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with the subsequent returns, while the variable of the Percentage of Products with  
Alliances positively correlates with post-IPO risk-adjusted returns. 
 
8. Conclusions  
In this study, we use both the direct valuation and relative valuation approaches to 
examine the factors that determine the valuation of biotech IPOs at three pricing stages.  
We use a rich information set of value drivers that consist of both financial and non-
financial variables.  In direct valuation analyses, R&D expenditures are consistently 
relevant to the pricing of our sample IPOs, whereas operating cash flow and sales change 
are significant in some models.18   The value-relevant non-financial variables are the 
output measures of the product development process, comprising the number of products 
under development, the stage of product development, and the legal protection of 
intellectual property by patents, as well as the alliance with other biotech companies.  Of 
the traditional IPO signals, which were found to be relevant in previous studies—
ownership retention, venture capital backing, and quality of underwriters—only the 
former (ownership retention) is consistently associated with IPO pricing.  Apparently 
having the fundamental, product-related indicators in the valuation model obviates the 
utility of indirect value signals.  The capital market climate prior at IPO is relevant in all 
three stages.  In the relative valuation analysis, the stage of product development, 
alliances, and ownership retention continue to be significant factors in determining 
relative values of  biotech IPOs. 
In addition, we also consider the long-term post-IPO performance of these firms.  
                                                 
18 This is consistent with Hand (2003) who notes that as firms mature, the value-relevance of financial 
variables increases. 
 38
The long-term (three-year) performance of IPOs suggests that investors’ general 
optimism at time of IPO (positive capital market climate) can be somewhat excessive, 
along with the positive reaction to patent protection.  Interestingly, investors concerns 
with alliances at the various IPO stages is also excessive, since the alliances variable has 
a positive and significant coefficient in the long-term regressions. 
Overall our findings indicate the importance of the underlying, product-related 
and competitive environment fundamentals in the pricing of IPOs.  With these variables 
we explain roughly 60–80% of the variability in prices. It is clear that proxies of these 
fundamentals, such as R&D expenditures, which are generally examined in the IPO 
valuation literature, provide an incomplete view of the economics and technology of 
biotech IPOs. 
Finally, can our findings based on biotech firms be generalized to other sectors?  
We believe so.  In the current, increasingly competitive global economic environment, 
new enterprises can succeed only by being innovative, namely developing unique 
products and services.  Information about product development and competitive 
environment, be it the success of products in alpha and beta tests in software companies, 
market penetration and store performance of retailers, or load factors and route franchise 
for new airlines, are, we believe, the major value drivers of IPOs in any sector. 
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Figure 1. Initial Public Offerings of Sample Firms  
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Table 1. Sample Selection Procedure  
 
The sample consists of biotech companies issuing initial public offerings (IPO) in the ten-year 
period of 1991–2000.  A list of IPO companies underwritten by firm-commitment contracts was 
obtained from the Global New Issue database (available from Thomson Financial Data 
Corporation), and offerings by pharmaceutical and biotech companies (with the three-digit SIC 
code of 283, or the four digit SIC code of 8731) were identified.  Unit offerings, ADRs, and 
offerings by foreign corporations (F-1 filings) were excluded from the sample.  The sample is 
further restricted to development-stage companies for which the products can be classified by the 
various development stages specified in the FDA approval process.  Data in parentheses indicate 
number of firms removed from the full set of 343 firms to obtain the final sample of 122 
companies. 
 
 
 
Sample Characteristics Number of Firms 
IPO firms in the biotech industry (with 3-digit SIC code of 283 or 
4-digit code of 8731) issued during 1991–2000 
 
343 
Excluding unit offerings, ADRs, and offerings by foreign 
companies 
 
(63) 
Excluding firms with no available prospectuses.  
 
(37) 
Excluding non-development-stage firms (e.g. generic drug 
producers) or firms with no stage information (e.g. medical device 
manufacturer or research service providers) 
 
(121) 
 
Final Firm Sample  122 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.  
 
Panel A. Dependent Variables 
 
The final 122-firm sample is as identified in Table 1.  Initial Offer Price is the midpoint of the offer price 
range indicated in the preliminary prospectus.  Final Offer Price is the final offer price of the IPO offering. 
Aftermarket Price is the closing price of the IPO share in the first aftermarket day of trading.  Initial Offer 
Market Value is the Initial Offer Price multiplied by the expected number of shares outstanding after IPO.  
Final Offer Market Value is the Final Offer Price multiplied by the expected number of shares outstanding 
after IPO.  Aftermarket Market Value is the Aftermarket Price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding after IPO.  Initial Offer, Final Offer, and Aftermarket Value-to-Asset Ratios are the Initial 
Offer, Final Offer, and Aftermarket Market Values divided by the book value of total assets of the fiscal 
year prior to the IPO.  P/V Ratios are the Initial Offer, Final Offer, and Aftermarket Value-To-Asset ratios 
divided by the corresponding ratio of the peer biotech firm. The matching peer biotech firm is a publicly 
traded firm in the biotech industry, with the closest value of total assets and with EBITDA of the same sign 
in the most recent fiscal year.  Initial Price Adjustment is the difference between the final offer price and 
expected offer price divided by the expected price.  Underpricing is the difference between the aftermarket 
price and final offer price divided by the final offer price. 
 
Variable Number of 
Firms  
Mean 25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Std Dev 
A. Share Prices       
Initial Offer Price 115 12.09 11.00 12.00 13.00 2.77 
Final Offer Price 115 10.67 8.00 10.00 12.50 3.50 
Aftermarket Price 113 12.45 8.50 11.00 14.00 6.95 
       
B. Market Values (in millions)       
Initial Offer Market Value 115 169.09 95.24 125.91 186.89 148.19 
Final Offer Market Value 115 155.01 69.53 101.40 174.12 151.85 
Aftermarket Market Value 112 193.31 71.88 106.91 212.55 224.53 
       
C. Value-to-Asset Ratios       
Initial Offer Value-To-Asset Ratio 115 20.66 7.10 12.49 25.37 20.45 
Final Offer Value-To-Asset Ratio 115 18.34 6.26 10.70 23.58 19.09 
Aftermarket Value-To-Asset Ratio 112 21.49 7.03 12.68 27.09 23.94 
       
Matching Firm Value-To-Asset Ratio 122 11.11 3.23 5.81 13.22 12.49 
       
D. Relative Valuation: P/V Ratios       
Initial Offer P/V Ratio  115 3.79 1.18 1.87 4.18 5.19 
Final Offer P/V Ratio 115 3.37 1.05 1.59 3.25 4.96 
After Market P/V Ratio 112 3.91 1.09 1.92 3.79 6.21 
       
C. Returns       
Initial Price Adjustment 115 –0.11 –0.29 –0.08 0.00 0.21 
Underpricing 106 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.14 0.30 
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Panel B.  Financial Variables 
 
Total Asset (data 6), Sales (data 12), EBITDA (data13) Earnings (data18), Shareholder’s Equity (data216), 
R&D Expense (data46), and Cash Flow from Operation (data308) of the fiscal year prior to the IPO 
offerings are collected from COMPUSTAT. Sales Change is the difference in revenue between the year of 
the IPO offering and the prior year.  Book-to-market ratio is calculated as the book value of equity (data60) 
at the end of first post-IPO fiscal year over the market value of equity at the close of the first trading day.  
The aforementioned financial information, if missing in COMPUSTAT, is supplemented by information 
hand-collected from the prospectuses and 10Ks.  All financial variables, except book-to-market, are in 
millions of dollars. 
 
Variable Number of 
Firms  
Mean 25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Std Dev 
       
Sample Firms:       
       
Total Assets  122 15.55 4.78 11.21 18.25 20.96 
Sales  122 3.33 0.00 1.19 4.42 6.89 
EBITDA 122 –6.82 –9.75 –5.45 –3.31 5.95 
       
Earnings 122 –7.34 –10.10 –5.93 –3.40 6.73 
Shareholder’s Equity  122 10.06 1.06 6.97 14.26 19.84 
R&D Expense 122 7.50 3.43 5.84 9.38 6.79 
Cash from Operation 122 –5.12 –7.83 –4.20 –2.45 5.67 
Sales Change 122 1.56 –0.04 0.18 2.50 3.68 
Book-To-Market 112 0.29 0.21 0.27 0.35 0.13 
       
Matching Firms:       
       
Total Assets  122 18.71 5.40 10.98 18.74 46.14 
Sales  122 4.32 0.08 2.12 5.12 6.97 
EBITDA 122 –6.37 –9.84 –5.60 –2.61 5.50 
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Panel C. Non-Financial Variables 
 
Sample Firms’ non-financial information in the year prior to the IPO offerings is hand-collected from the 
prospectuses.  Number of Employees and Number of PhDs/MDs are the firm’s total number of employees 
and the number of employees with the indicated advanced degrees.  Development Stage is a numerical 
variable, which is assigned a value of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, and 12 for products in the stage of screening, 
development, preclinical testing, IND application, phase-I clinical trials, phase-II clinical trials, phase-III 
clinical trials, and NDA application or on the market, respectively.  Number of Products is the total number 
of products in these development stages.  Average Development Stage of Pipeline is the average 
development stage of all products (pipeline) for each firm.  Number of Patents Owned is the number of U.S. 
patents owned by that company.  Alliance Agreements include strategic alliance, joint venture/committee, 
licensing, R&D collaboration, marketing/distribution, manufacturing, and supply agreements.  Number of 
Alliances is the number of these alliance agreements reported in the prospectus of each IPO firm.  Number 
(Percentage) of Products with Patents is the number (percentage) of products with patent protection.  
Number (percentage) of Products with Alliances is the number (percentage) of products covered by the 
alliance agreements.  Number (percentage) of Products with Commercial Rights Assigned to Alliance 
Partners is the number (percentage) of products whose commercial rights are thus assigned.  Ownership 
Retention is the percentage of ownership retained by the pre-IPO shareholders.  Market Condition is the 
cumulative return of the value-weighted biotech index for the six months prior to the IPO.  Venture Capital 
Backing is a binary variable, with value of one for IPO firms backed by venture capitalist, and zero 
otherwise.  Underwriter Ranking is the Carter–Manaster ranking. 
 
Variable Number 
of firms  
Mean 25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Std Dev 
       
Fundamental Variables       
       
Number of Total Products 122 8.01 5.00 7.50 9.00 4.46 
Average Development Stage of Pipeline 122 3.87 2.33 3.58 5.20 1.89 
Number of Patents Owned 117 7.46 2.00 5.00 8.00 10.47 
Number of Alliance Agreements 122 2.22 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.87 
       
Number of Products with Patents 122 4.48 1.00 4.00 7.00 4.53 
Number of Products with Alliances 122 2.77 1.00 2.00 4.00 2.68 
Number of Products with Commercial Rights 
Assigned to Alliance Partners 122 1.84 0.00 1.00 3.00 2.51 
       
Percentage of Products with Patents 122 0.58 0.11 0.75 1.00 0.41 
Percentage of Products with Alliances 122 0.37 0.13 0.33 0.56 0.30 
Percentage of Products with Commercial 
Rights Assigned to Alliance Partners 
122 0.22 0.00 0.12 0.38 0.27 
       
Signaling and Market Condition Variables       
       
Ownership Retention 122 0.74 0.71 0.74 0.78 0.07 
Venture Capital Backing 122 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.29 
Underwriter Ranking 122 5.96 0.00 8.75 8.88 3.82 
Market Condition 122 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.25 0.13 
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Table 3. Pearson (Upper Right) / Spearman (Lower Left) Correlation Coefficients  
 
The 122-firm sample is as identified in Table 1.  Financial variables and non-financial variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.  The tabulated Initial 
Offer Market Value, Final Offer Market Value, Cash Flow from Operations, R&D Expense, Sales Change, Number of Total Products, and the Average 
Development Stage of Pipeline are scaled by Total Assets.  One, two, and three asterisks indicate the two-tailed significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Initial Final After Cash R&D 
Sales 
Change 
Own 
Retent VC 
Under 
writer 
Mkt 
Cond 
Total 
Product Stage Patent Alliance 
 Comm. 
Rights 
Initial Offer Market Value  0.96*** 0.90*** –0.80*** 0.80*** 0.28*** –0.01 –0.12 –0.15 0.13 0.67*** 0.76*** 0.17* –0.06 –0.27*** 
Final Offer Market Value 0.95
***  0.96*** –0.78*** 0.76*** 0.24** –0.05 –0.20** –0.13 0.21** 0.61*** 0.70*** 0.18** –0.04 –0.27*** 
Aftermarket Market Value 0.91
*** 0.97***  –0.75*** 0.72*** 0.26*** 0.03 –0.28*** –0.16* 0.18* 0.48*** 0.59*** 0.22** –0.11 –0.26*** 
Cash Flow from 
Operations 
–0.66*** –0.63*** –0.58***  –0.90*** –0.25*** 0.11 0.14 0.16** –0.13 –0.58*** –0.60*** –0.16* 0.05 0.21** 
R&D Expense 0.70
*** 0.67*** 0.56*** –0.75***  –0.16* –0.09 –0.11 –0.16* 0.13 0.54*** 0.57*** 0.11 0.06 –0.16* 
Sales Change 0.10 0.14 0.21
** –0.12 0.06  0.04 0.00 –0.04 0.17* 0.27*** 0.29** –0.10 –0.01 0.03 
Ownership Retention –0.04 –0.08 0.03 0.23
*** –0.21** 0.07  0.26*** 0.01 –0.02 –0.30*** –0.27*** –0.04 0.09 0.00 
Venture Capital Backing –0.08 –0.14 –0.17
* 0.07 –0.01 0.13 0.22**  0.08 –0.07 –0.16** –0.20** –0.15* 0.04 0.07 
Underwriter Ranking –0.28
*** –0.27*** –0.31*** 0.29*** –0.15* 0.04 0.03 0.12  0.05 –0.20** –0.25*** –0.21** 0.08 0.11 
Market Condition 0.04 0.12 0.11 –0.02 0.08 0.19
** –0.03 –0.04 0.12  –0.04 0.01 –0.15 –0.02 0.05 
Number of Total Products 0.71
*** 0.68*** 0.64*** –0.55*** 0.64*** 0.12 –0.32*** –0.13 –0.15* 0.04  0.68*** 0.00 –0.09 –0.13 
Average Development 
Stage of Pipeline 
0.72*** 0.68*** 0.63*** –0.63*** 0.58*** –0.03 –0.36*** –0.23** –0.10 –0.06 0.74***  0.13 0.03 –0.20** 
Percentage of Products 
with Patents 
0.15 0.15 0.18* –0.20** 0.07 –0.13 0.01 –0.15* –0.23** –0.17* –0.02 0.20**  0.15 0.03 
Percentage of Products 
with Alliances 
–0.08 –0.08 –0.15 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.02 –0.16* –0.07 0.14  0.63*** 
Percentage of Products 
with Commercial 
Rights Assigned to 
Partners 
–0.27*** –0.28*** –0.27*** 0.24*** –0.14 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.11 –0.11 –0.29*** 0.00 0.57***  
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Table 4. Regressions of Initial Offer Market Values  
on Financial and Non-Financial Variables 
 
The 122-firm sample is as identified in Table 1.  The dependent variable is Initial Offer Market Value 
(calculated as product of the midpoint of the offer range indicated in the preliminary prospectuses, and 
expected shares outstanding after the offering) scaled by asset value.  Other financial and non-financial 
variables are described in Table 2.  Variables of Cash Flow from Operations, R&D Expense, Sales Change, 
Number of Total Products, and the Average Development Stage of Pipeline are scaled by Total Assets.  
Underwriter Ranking is scaled by nine, the maximum scores possible.  Entries are coefficients with t-
statistics in parenthesis.  One, two, and three asterisks indicate the two-tailed significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 5.66*** 
(3.62) 
–9.18 
(–0.73) 
–50.48*** 
(–5.00) 
Cash Flow from Operations –6.43** 
(–2.62) 
–6.59*** 
(–2.62) 
–0.75 
(–0.39) 
R&D Expense 10.47*** 
(3.74) 
10.32*** 
(3.63) 
9.57*** 
(4.48) 
Sales Change 3.35 
(1.65) 
3.12 
(1.48) 
2.10 
(1.37) 
Ownership Retention … 22.61 
(1.31) 
66.10*** 
(5.02) 
Venture Capital Backing … –1.86 
(–0.45) 
0.94 
(0.31) 
Underwriter Ranking … –0.71 
(–0.27) 
1.56 
(0.78) 
Market Condition … 2.24 
(0.25) 
12.69* 
(1.93) 
Number of Total Products … … 2.78*** 
(3.51) 
Average Development Stage of Pipeline … … 7.94*** 
(6.67) 
Percentage of Products with Patents  … … 5.43** 
(2.60) 
Percentage of Products with Alliances … … –8.74*** 
(–3.04) 
Adjusted R2 66.74% 66.08% 82.70% 
No. Observations 114 114 114 
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Table 5. Regressions of Final Offer Market Values  
on Financial and Non-Financial Variables 
 
The 122-firm sample is as identified in Table 1.  The dependent variable is Offer Market Value (calculated 
as product of the final offer price and expected shares outstanding after the offering) scaled by asset value. 
Other financial and non-financial variables are described in Table 2.  Variables of Cash Flow from 
Operations, R&D Expense, Sales Change, Number of Total Products, and the Average Development Stage 
of Pipeline are scaled by Total Assets.  Underwriter Ranking is scaled by nine, the maximum scores 
possible.  Entries are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis.  One, two, and three asterisks indicate the 
two-tailed significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 5.05*** 
(3.20) 
–2.32 
(–0.19) 
–36.36*** 
(–3.12) 
Cash Flow from Operations –6.97*** 
(–2.80) 
–6.83*** 
(–2.73) 
–2.22 
(–0.99) 
R&D Expense 8.07*** 
(2.85) 
7.86*** 
(2.78) 
7.05*** 
(2.85) 
Sales Change 4.04* 
(1.97) 
3.31 
(1.56) 
2.43 
(1.37) 
Ownership Retention … 16.06 
(0.94) 
50.81*** 
(3.34) 
Venture Capital Backing … –6.14 
(–1.49) 
–3.72 
(–1.07) 
Underwriter Ranking … –0.84 
(–0.31) 
0.99 
(0.43) 
Market Condition … 13.85 
(1.55) 
22.71*** 
(2.99) 
Number of Total Products  … … 2.22** 
(2.43) 
Average Development Stage of Pipeline … … 6.49*** 
(4.72) 
Percentage of Products with Patents … … 5.02** 
(2.07) 
Percentage of Products with Alliances … … –5.83* 
(–1.75) 
Adjusted R2 61.94% 62.38% 74.13% 
No. Observations 114 114 114 
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Table 6. Regressions of Aftermarket Market Values 
 on Financial and Non-Financial Variables  
 
The 122-firm sample is as identified in Table 1.  The dependent variable is the Aftermarket Market Value 
(calculated as product of the closing price and number of shares outstanding at the end of the first day 
trading after the IPO) scaled by asset value.  Other financial and non-financial variables are described in 
Table 2.  Variables of Cash Flow from Operations, R&D Expense, Sales Change, Number of Total 
Products, and the Average Development Stage of Pipeline are scaled by Total Assets.  Underwriter 
Ranking is scaled by nine, the maximum scores possible.  Entries are coefficients with t-statistics in 
parenthesis. Entries are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis.  One, two, and three asterisks indicate 
the two-tailed significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 5 
Intercept 6.37*** 
(3.01) 
–14.02 
(–0.85) 
–41.95*** 
(–2.56) 
Cash Flow from Operations –6.89** 
(–2.06) 
–6.73** 
(–2.04) 
0.37 
(0.11) 
R&D Expense 8.21** 
(2.16) 
8.28** 
(2.22) 
8.87** 
(2.50) 
Sales Change 9.32*** 
(3.64) 
8.92*** 
(3.45) 
7.93*** 
(3.32) 
Ownership Retention … 47.39** 
(2.10) 
72.62*** 
(3.36) 
Venture Capital Backing … –13.89** 
(–2.65) 
–8.31* 
(–1.67) 
Underwriter Ranking … –4.55 
(–1.32) 
–2.97 
(–0.91) 
Market Condition … 8.49 
(0.76) 
19.06* 
(1.78) 
Number of Total Products … … 0.77 
(0.57) 
Average Development Stage of Pipeline … … 7.37*** 
(3.45) 
Percentage of Products with Patents … … 7.83** 
(2.30) 
Percentage of Products with Alliances … … –10.74** 
(–2.37) 
Adjusted R2 48.05% 51.82% 59.68% 
No. Observations 110 110 110 
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Table 7. Regressions of P/V Ratios at Different IPO Stages 
 on Financial and Non-Financial Variables  
 
The 122-firm sample is as identified in Table 1.  The dependent variables of P/V Ratios are the Initial Offer, 
Final Offer, and Aftermarket Value-To-Asset ratios divided by the corresponding (value-to-asset) ratio of 
the peer biotech firm. The peer biotech firm is a publicly traded firm in the biotech industry, with the 
closest value of total assets and with EBITDA of the same sign in the most recent fiscal year.  Other 
financial and non-financial variables are described in Table 2.  Variables of Cash Flow from Operations, 
R&D Expense, Sales Change, Number of Total Products, and the Average Development Stage of Pipeline 
are scaled by Total Assets.  Underwriter Ranking is scaled by nine, the maximum scores possible.  Entries 
are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis.  One, two, and three asterisks indicate the two-tailed 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Initial Offer P/V Final Offer P/V Aftermarket P/V 
Intercept –4.31 
(–1.11) 
–3.34 
(–0.91) 
–6.62 
(–1.45) 
Cash Flow from Operations 0.88 
(1.16) 
0.81 
(1.12) 
0.85 
(0.92) 
R&D Expense 0.27 
(0.34) 
0.16 
(0.21) 
–0.40 
(–0.41) 
Sales Change 1.27*** 
(3.71) 
1.04*** 
(3.22) 
1.18*** 
(3.05) 
Ownership Retention 9.28* 
(1.85) 
8.31* 
(1.74) 
12.21** 
(2.04) 
Venture Capital Backing –0.81 
(–0.66) 
–1.58 
(–1.37) 
–1.64 
(–1.20) 
Underwriter Ranking 1.10 
(1.45) 
1.14 
(1.59) 
1.23 
(1.40) 
Market Condition 3.93 
(1.58) 
4.51* 
(1.92) 
7.46** 
(2.54) 
Number of Total Products –0.33 
(–1.09) 
–0.36 
(–1.24) 
–0.33 
(–0.88) 
Average Development Stage of Pipeline 2.25*** 
(4.71) 
2.16*** 
(4.75) 
2.41*** 
(4.08) 
Percentage of Products with Patents 0.24 
(0.31) 
0.40 
(0.53) 
1.09 
(1.16) 
Percentage of Products with Alliances –2.46** 
(–2.24) 
–2.33** 
(–2.24) 
–2.17* 
(–1.73) 
Adjusted R2 32.87% 32.10% 29.84% 
No. Observations 113 113 110 
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Table 8. Regressions of Initial Price Adjustments on Financial and Non-Financial Variables 
 
The 122-firm sample is as identified in Table 1.  The dependent variable, Initial Price Adjustment, is the 
difference between the final offer price and expected offer price divided by the expected offer price.  Offer 
Range Width is the percentage width of the preliminary offer price range, calculated as (High Offer Price – 
Low Offer Price)/Low Offer Price.  Expected Initial Offer Size is the product of Initial Offer Price and 
number of shares offered.  Other financial and non-financial variables are described in Table 2.  Variables 
of Cash Flow from Operations, R&D Expense, Sales Change, Number of Total Products, and the Average 
Development Stage of Pipeline are scaled by Total Assets.  Underwriter Ranking is scaled by nine, the 
maximum scores possible.  Entries are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis.  One, two, and three 
asterisks indicate the two-tailed significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept –0.11 
(–1.16) 
0.09 
(0.37) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
Cash Flow from Operations –0.03 
(–0.60) 
0.03 
(0.58) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
R&D Expense –0.02 
(–0.41) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
–0.02 
(–0.32) 
Sales Change 0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.08) 
–0.01 
(–0.35) 
Log (Total Asset) 0.03 
(1.27) 
–0.01 
(–0.27) 
–0.01 
(–0.35) 
Book To Market –0.29* 
(–1.66) 
–0.35** 
(–2.06) 
–0.30* 
(–1.69) 
Ownership Retention  –1.02*** 
(–2.99) 
–1.13*** 
(–3.22) 
Venture Capital Backing  –0.19*** 
(–2.65) 
–0.20*** 
(–2.78) 
Underwriter Ranking  0.03 
(0.62) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
Offer Range Width - 1.06** 
(2.38) 
1.21** 
(2.54) 
Log(Expected Initial Offer Size) - 0.17*** 
(3.26) 
0.21*** 
(3.68) 
Market Condition  0.29*** 
(2.84) 
0.27** 
(2.49) 
Number of Total Products   0.00 
(0.15) 
Average Development Stage of Pipeline   0.01 
(0.37) 
Percentage of Products with Patents   –0.04 
(–0.78) 
Percentage of Products with Alliances   0.12* 
(1.67) 
Adjusted R2 0.36% 21.14% 21.65% 
No. Observations 105 105 105 
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Table 9.  Regressions of Underpricing on Financial and Non-Financial Variables 
 
The 122-firm sample is as identified in Table 1.  The dependent variable, Underpricing, is the difference 
between the aftermarket price and final offer price divided by the final offer price.  Initial Price Adjustment 
is the difference between the final offer price and expected offer price divided by the expected offer price.  
Nasdaq Market Return on IPO is the return of Nasdaq Composite Index during the first day of each sample 
firm.  Offer Range Width is the percentage width of the preliminary offer price range, calculated as (High 
Offer Price – Low Offer Price)/Low Offer Price.  Expected Final Offer Size is the product of Final Offer 
Price and number of shares offered.  Other financial and non-financial variables are described in Table 2.  
Variables of Cash Flow from Operations, R&D Expense, Sales Change, Number of Total Products, and the 
Average Development Stage of Pipeline are scaled by Total Assets.  Underwriter Ranking is scaled by 
nine, the maximum scores possible.  Entries are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis.  One, two, and 
three asterisks indicate the two-tailed significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.10 
(1.10) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.10 
(0.39) 
0.20 
(0.84) 
Cash Flow from Operations –0.03 
(–0.64) 
–0.02 
(–0.53) 
–0.02 
(–0.53) 
–0.02 
(–0.40) 
R&D Expense –0.01 
(–0.12) 
–0.01 
(–0.13) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
Sales Change 0.01 
(0.38) 
0.00 
(0.25) 
0.01 
(0.61) 
0.00 
(0.15) 
Log (Total Asset) 0.05** 
(2.07) 
0.04 
(1.23) 
0.02 
(0.56) 
0.03 
(0.87) 
Book To Market –0.43*** 
(–2.64) 
–0.35** 
(–2.25) 
–0.38** 
(–2.33) 
–0.41** 
(–2.56) 
Ownership Retention … 0.36 
(1.11) 
0.43 
(1.29) 
0.35 
(1.06) 
Venture Capital Backing … –0.10 
(–1.50) 
–0.10 
(–1.40) 
–0.08 
(–1.09) 
Underwriter Ranking … –0.03 
(–0.70) 
–0.02 
(–0.54) 
–0.05 
(–1.16) 
Initial Price Adjustment … 0.36*** 
(3.08) 
0.40*** 
(3.17) 
0.40*** 
(3.32) 
Log(Expected Final Offer Size) … –0.00 
(–0.08) 
–0.02 
(–0.45) 
–0.05 
(–1.00) 
Nasdaq Market Return on IPO Date … 4.83*** 
(3.49) 
4.84*** 
(3.39) 
5.38*** 
(3.84) 
Number of Total Products … … –0.01 
(–0.56) 
–0.01 
(–0.43) 
Average Development Stage of Pipeline … … –0.02 
(–0.74) 
–0.04 
(–1.25) 
Percentage of Products with Patents … … 0.01 
(0.24) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
Percentage of Products with Alliances … … –0.06 
(–0.99) 
–0.04 
(–0.67) 
Final Offer P/V … …  0.01** 
(2.54) 
Adjusted R2 7.12% 29.66% 28.13% 32.32% 
No. Observations 104 104 104 104 
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Table 10. 
 Post-Issuance Long-run Performance of IPO Firms  
 
The initial sample of biotech  IPOs is as identified in Table 1.  The variable BHAR is the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return, calculated as equally weighted buy-and-hold returns of IPO firms in excess of the 
corresponding returns of a matching portfolio in 2nd to 37th months subsequent to the month of IPO 
issuance. If a firm is delisted before the 37th month, its return is compounded up to the delisting month.  
The matching portfolios are generated by first forming size quintile breakpoints using NYSE firms.  The 
quintiles are split further into book-to-market quintiles on NYSE firms. The universe of non-IPO firms is 
allocated into the resulting 25 portfolios. Breakpoints are recalculated annually and equally weighted 
portfolio returns are computed. Return performance of full sample, as well as subsamples of IPO firms with 
above- (high) and below- (low) median value in variables of market condition, development stage (scaled 
by total asset value), number of products (scaled by total asset value), percentage of products with patents, 
percentage of products with alliances, and underwriter ranking are presented. Return performance of 
subsamples of IPO firms with/without  venture capital backing are also tabulated. Entries are mean returns 
with t-statistics in parenthesis.  One, two, and three asterisks indicate the significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
 BHAR 
Full Sample -14.32% 
(-1.34) 
Subsamples sorted by market condition: 
high -22.81% 
(-1.57) 
low -4.17% 
(-0.26) 
Subsamples sorted by development stage: 
high -20.76% 
(-1.35) 
low -8.00% 
(-0.53) 
Subsamples sorted by number of products: 
high -3.95% 
(-0.24) 
low -25.78%* 
(-1.88) 
Subsamples sorted by percentage of products with patents 
high -30.40%** 
(-2.62) 
low 3.43% 
(0.19) 
Subsamples sorted by products with alliances: 
high 8.61% 
(0.58) 
low -36.81%** 
(-2.48) 
Subsamples sorted by underwriter ranking: 
high -13.23% 
(-0.92) 
low -15.31% 
(-0.97) 
Subsamples sorted by VC backing: 
with VC -18.64%* 
(-1.81) 
without VC 17.72% 
(0.37) 
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Table 11. Cross-section Regression of Post-Issuance Long-Term Performance  
Buy-and-hold Abnormal Return 
 
The sample of biotech  IPOs is as identified in Table 1.  The dependent variable BHAR is the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return, calculated as equally weighted buy-and-hold returns of IPO firms in excess of the 
corresponding returns of a matching portfolio in 2nd to 37th months subsequent to the month of IPO 
issuance. If a firm is delisted before the 37th month, its return is compounded up to the delisting month. 
LBHAR is calculated as the difference between the logarithm of (1+BHAR), and the logarithm of (1+the 
corresponding return of the matching portfolio). The matching portfolios are generated by first forming size 
quintile breakpoints using NYSE firms.  The quintiles are split further into book-to-market quintiles on 
NYSE firms. The universe of non-IPO firms is allocated into the resulting 25 portfolios. Breakpoints are 
recalculated annually and equally weighted portfolio returns are computed. Other financial and non-
financial variables are described in Table 2.  Variables of Sales Change, R&D Expense, Number of Total 
Products, and the Average Development Stage of Pipeline are scaled by Total Assets. See Entries are 
coefficients with t -statistics in parenthesis.  One, two and three asterisks indicate the significance at the 10, 
5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable BHAR LBHAR 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 
 
1.10 
(0.82) 
0.22 
(0.51) 
0.60 
(0.48) 
-0.11 
(-0.26) 
Sales Change 
 
0.45** 
(2.07) 
0.36* 
(1.82) 
0.32 
(1.63) 
0.28 
(1.48) 
Log (Total Asset) 
 
0.09 
(0.47) 
- -0.00 
(-0.03) 
- 
R&D Expense 
 
-0.03 
(-0.18) 
- 0.06 
(0.41) 
- 
Ownership Retention 
 
-1.30 
(-0.67) 
- -0.42 
(-0.23) 
 
- 
Market condition 
 
-1.55 
(-1.65) 
-1.38 
(-1.59) 
-0.87 
(-1.02) 
-0.82 
(-1.01) 
Number of Products 
 
0.00 
(-0.10) 
- -0.00 
(-0.08) 
- 
Average Development Stage  of Pipeline -0.10 
(-0.62) 
- -0.25 
(-1.58) 
- 
Percentage of Products with  Patents 
 
-0.43 
(-1.50) 
-0.48* 
(-1.78) 
-0.59** 
(-2.29) 
-0.54** 
(-2.20) 
 
Percentage of Products with  Alliances 
 
0.84** 
(2.18) 
0.83** 
(2.29) 
0.93** 
(2.62) 
0.83** 
(2.45) 
Venture Capital Backing 
 
-0.40 
(-1.03) 
-0.33 
(-0.91) 
-0.51 
(-1.44) 
-0.44 
(-1.30) 
Underwriter Ranking 0.00 
(0.01) 
- -0.03 
(-1.20) 
- 
Adjusted R2 
 
4.29% 7.46% 7.27% 7.58% 
No. Observations 101 101 102 102 
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Table 12. Cross-section Regression of  Post-Issuance Long-Term Performance 
Risk-Adjusted Return 
 
The sample of biotech  IPOs is as identified in Table 1.  The dependent variable is the risk-adjusted return,  
calculated by  regressing each sample firm’s monthly return in excess of one month T-bill rate on the Fama 
and French factors in the period of the 2nd to 37th months (or to the month of delisting) subsequent to the 
month of IPO issuance. .  Other financial and non-financial variables are described in Table 2.  Variables of 
Sales Change, R&D Expense, Number of Total Products, and the Average Development Stage of Pipeline 
are scaled by Total Assets. Entries are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis.  One, two and three 
asterisks indicate the significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables Risk-Adjusted Return 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 
 
0.100** 
(2.30) 
0.024** 
(1.67) 
 
Sales Change 
 
0.010 
(1.52) 
0.006 
(0.94) 
Log( Total Asset) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
- 
R&D Expense 
 
0.004 
(0.82) 
- 
Ownership Retention 
 
-0.091 
(-1.55) 
- 
Market condition 
 
-0.039 
(-1.35) 
-0.029 
(-1.05) 
Number of Products 
 
-0.002 
(-0.61) 
- 
Average Development Stage of Pipeline -0.007 
(-1.45) 
- 
Percentage of Products with  Patents 
 
-0.020** 
(-2.34) 
-0.021** 
(-2.41) 
Percentage of Products with  Alliances 
 
0.037*** 
(3.10) 
0.035** 
(3.00) 
Venture Capital Backing 
 
-0.011 
(-0.92) 
-0.011 
(-1.02) 
Underwriter Ranking -0.002* 
(-1.77) 
-0.002* 
(-1.75) 
Adjusted R2 
 
10.53% 9.62% 
No. Observations 102 102 
 
